Building civil society institutions in post-authoritarian regimes

Building civil society institutions in post-authoritarian regimes

    Friday, February 11, 2011   No comments

by Ahmed E, Souaiaia*

Regardless of what happen in the next months, the year 2011 will enter the history books as the breakthrough year for Arab societies. On January 14, 2011, the Tunisian people ended the reign of a ruthless dictator and with it ended fear. The Tunisian revolution soon inspired peoples of other Arab countries to take charge of their own destiny. On January 23, thousands of Egyptians launched a similar revolt to bring an end to Hosni Mubarak’s reign. There are indications that Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan will be transformed with or without protests. The Gulf states, too, will not remain unaffected by revolutions that are not only bringing about political change but also psychological transformation in the soul of Arab citizens; people taking charge of their own destiny and taking full ownership of their state of affairs.

The future of Arab societies is dependent on the transition from authoritarian rule to pluralism. There are many who are calling on the creation of civil society institutions starting with political parties, NGOs, and free press. In fact, just today, it was reported that a group of Saudis formally requested from the kind to allow them to form a political party. It is all positive change, but it may be placing emphasis on the wrong priorities. Establishing these entities immediately may have a long term negative impact on issues of social justice and rule of law. Replacing one-man Arab regimes by multi parties regimes can be just as oppressive and perhaps more suffocating. Instead, it is argued here that the transition to self-governance can be achieved when the separation of power takes precedence over partisan power sharing.

Not to suggest that power sharing among various political parties and representatives of interest groups is not a good thing, for it is. But the power sharing model is also susceptible to creating elite that could--and in most cases did--fence out marginalized minorities and the vulnerable groups and individuals.

What is proposed here is to focus the energy of change ushered in by these popular movements to create safeguards that shore up the rule of law, separate governing authorities, and empower watchdog organizations. The first step for establishing stable self-governing societies in the Arab world is to use the transitional period to draft constitutions, subject to popular referendum, that enshrine the independence of the judiciary, the sovereignty of the legislature, and the service-centered authority of the executive power.

To begin by establishing political parties and NGOs before securing the separation of powers is similar to placing the chariot before the horse. After all, one could ask, how effective can a human rights organization be in a paradigm where the judicial authority answers to the executive officer whose agents are generally the main culprits of committing human rights violations? The authoritarian Arab regimes were able to oppress with impunity because the legislature and the judiciary were tools in their hand. They used these branches of government to provide them with legal and legislative covers even as they arbitrarily arrested citizens, tortured political opponents, and misused public funds.

It will be utterly misguided if the new ruling elite that will emerge after these popular revolutions are allowed to create a new paradigm that would give the illusion of pluralistic governance but in reality preserve a power structure that marginalizes vulnerable social groups.

Civil society institutions are strongest when the legal and judicial mechanisms upon which they are founded are sound. Practically, this can be achieved by recognizing the various layers of civil society institutions.

First, constitutional and legal separation of powers must be guaranteed and established in reality. Moreover, leaders must find creative ways to evaluate and tenure judges. The less politics is involved in identifying, reviewing, and conferring tenure for judges the more empowered the judiciary will be in its application of the law and in preventing abuse of power.

The second important layer of civil society institutions consists of the presence of free and independent press. In most Arab countries, there are many news and media outlets that claim to be free and independent. A close examination of the structure of these institutions and the control over them reveal that they are not necessarily free and independent. Medial and press outlets in Arab countries are either state owned or privately controlled. The privately controlled outlets include newspapers and other media that are owned by political parties, unions, associations, and businesspersons. While the government controlled media are essentially propaganda tools, the privately held outlets promote the narrow interests of the shareholders and owners. Given that the press’ mission is to inform the public, one can hardly believe that an entity thus structured could indeed fulfill its mission with integrity. After all, how could such an institution faithfully serve two masters—the shareholders/owners and the public?

A free and independent press should have as primary mission the dissemination of critical information to citizens. It should exist to inform and to keep the governments’ dealings open and transparent. That goal cannot be achieved if the media or the press answers to shareholders or to political parties’ leaders. Creative and imaginative ways must be used to categorize and license free and independent press—perhaps relying on a combination of public funding, education, training, and legal regulations.

The last layer of civil society institutions would consist of any and all social groups representing all kinds of interests. This layer will be critical in providing services and empowering minorities, but as stated above, it cannot perform its functions if there is no rule of law or if the branches of government are not separate and sovereign.

Islamic societies are at a critical juncture. They could use this opportunity and build forward looking societies. They have a chance to learn from the mistakes of other societies: they can draft better constitutions, they can elect better leaders, and they can establish stronger foundations for the emergence of civil society institutions. They can turn the disadvantage of embracing pluralistic governance late by learning from the mistakes of those who preceded them. They could rely on hindsight to move beyond the shortcomings of older systems. They can reflect on the decades of hopelessness, marginalization, oppression, and denial of basic rights to create inclusive, civil, and proud peoples. They can give meaning to their existence in the clarity of collective wisdom, in the soberness of knowledge, and in the hopeful determination of dreamers.

* Professor Souaiaia, teaches classes in the department of Religious Studies, International Programs, and College of Law at the University of Iowa. Opinions expressed herein are the author’s, speaking as a citizen on matters of public interest; not speaking for the University or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

Diplomatic Hemorrhage: US administration’s need for forward-looking policy

Diplomatic Hemorrhage: US administration’s need for forward-looking policy

    Monday, January 31, 2011   No comments

by A. E. SOUAIAIA

It was a mistake for President Obama to call Husni Mubarak on the fourth day of the Egyptian revolt, after nearly 100 people have died, to advise him for anything else but to step down and let a transitional leadership prepare for fair, transparent, and pluralistic elections. Instead, his reaching out to Mubarak to push him to reform was seen by many Egyptians as an act of support of a dictator. To ask Mubarak for reform now is to give him a second lease on political life. Mubarak has had 28 years to reform. He has not. In fact the last sham elections he held consolidated his party’s rule and produced a parliament less pluralistic than the previous one.

Every day that passes with Mubarak being president, the US administration loses its goodwill capital with the Egyptian and Arab peoples. US administrations have sided with authoritarians for the sake of predictability and short term stability. These authoritarians have fed US policy makers the idea that US interests are necessarily tied to their regimes remaining in power. These regimes have contended that if they were to go, Islamists will turn their countries into another post 1979 Iran. What was left out, however, was the fact that the Iranian people were not and are not inherently anti-American; they were turned to anti-Americanism when the US administrations sided with the Shah and ignored the demands of the Iranian people. This and future US administrations should not repeat the same mistake.

The US support of Mubarak’s regime is well established. Now, the US administration has a chance to show that its commitment to peoples’ rights to freedom and self-determination are not and cannot be compromised. One way of doing this is to take the side of the people now, not when Mubarak falls.

According to Secretary Clinton, who spoke on CNN’s State of the Union today, the people she "want to see stay in power are Mubarak and his newly appointed Vice President." She hinted that she prefers that the current timeline is preserved: wait until this autumn's presidential elections to make change. This position is misguided and clearly rejected by the Egyptian people. The Egyptian people want constitutional reform, judicial reform, economic reform, and political reform; not merely changing the president. This parliament is not legitimate in the eyes of many Egyptians.

The question is no longer whether or not Mubarak and his regime will stays in power. As far as the Egyptian people are concerned, Mubarak is history. Today, opposition leaders, including the Muslim Brethren, which had 88 members in the outgoing parliament have agreed to designate Mohammed ElBaradei spokesperson and authorized him to put together a coalition government that will oversee the transition into democratic rule. The Obama administration could and should support this initiative in order to mitigate previous missteps.

* Professor Souaiaia, teaches classes in the department of Religious Studies, International Programs, and College of Law at the University of Iowa. Opinions expressed herein are the author’s, speaking as a citizen on matters of public interest; not speaking for the University or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

Oil and Infrastructure Expenditures in Saudi Arabia

Oil and Infrastructure Expenditures in Saudi Arabia

    Monday, January 24, 2011   No comments

by Ahmad M. Khatib

The country of Saudi Arabia has been generating increasingly more revenue from sales of crude oil in recent years. The researcher tried to study the impact greater oil revenue has been having on the development of the country’s economy through measuring the impact of oil revenue on infrastructure as one of the most important sectors of the economy. The study explored the relationship between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure during the period of 1983-2007.

The study tried, on one hand, to find out if the increase in oil revenue had been associated with a similar increase in government expenditures on infrastructure. On the other hand, the study tried to measure the improvements these expenditures made by testing the relationship between infrastructure expenditures and some of the improvements resulted from these expenditures during the same period of 1983 to 2007.

The findings of this study suggested that the increase in oil revenue caused only a limited increase in government expenditures on infrastructure and the improvements resulted from these expenditures had also been limited.

Introduction

Saudi Arabia as the largest oil exporter in the world has been collecting massive amounts of cash from oil revenue as prices of crude oil has been rapidly going up in the last few years. Many wonder how this oil revenue is helping the country of Saudi Arabia achieving economic development and prosperity. One way to answer this question is to measure the impact that oil revenue is having on the development of infrastructure. This study tests the correlation or the relationship between oil revenue and infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia during the period of 1983-2007 to see whether greater oil revenue was associated with a similar increase in these expenditures.

The study also looks at the relationship between these expenditures and some improvements achieved from these expenditures during the same time period. The importance of the study stems from the fact that no study had focused on the specific relationship between oil revenue and the Saudi government main budget expenditures in total or individually or on the effects of these expenditures on their related sectors of the Saudi economy. So, the importance of the study comes from the lack of a documented quantitative study on this topic.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Infrastructure is a broad term used by economists to refer to a group of capital assets in a certain country or locality. There is no clear definition of what is included under infrastructure. Nevertheless, Pollin (2009) divided infrastructure into three areas: transportation, energy, and water management. He further divided those areas into sub areas which includes, roads and bridges, airports, railroads, public transportation systems, drinking water, dams, electric grids, and pipelines moving oil and natural gas.

Other researchers like Similarly, Torrance (2009) divided infrastructure into three categories: transport infrastructure, regulated infrastructure such as water, electricity and gas distribution, and social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals.

No matter what the definition of infrastructure is or its components are, the fact is that infrastructure investment stimulates the economy by improving performance and productivity which, in turn, helps bring about economic growth. Smit and Trigeorgis

(2009) believed that infrastructure investment builds a platform and creates a base for the growth strategy and it is the starting point for any investment to follow.

            The largely recognized positive impact infrastructure investments have on the economy as a direct cause for economic growth encourages different governments around the world to allocate sizable portions of their budgets to infrastructure to stimulate the economy, provide jobs, and of course improve their infrastructure.

           

Infrastructure in Saudi Arabia

Ever since oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia, the government has been spending enormous resources on building the country’s infrastructure almost from scratch. The country has achieved significant improvements in building its highways, airports, power generating plants, refineries, desalination plants, shopping centers, schools, and hospitals.

Most of this happened in the last half century as Clarke (2007) commented “Saudi Arabia has gone from a country of fractured tribes living in sand-swept villages, to a thriving, industrial nation dotted with skyscrapers, superhighways, airports and factories.” (Clarke,

2007, p. 32)

            The huge growth in infrastructure was a direct result of the growing petroleum industry. Kronemer (1997) indicated that during this growth that took place in less than 50 years, more than 80,000 miles of paved roads were built, 4000 hospitals and health centers, hundreds of schools and several universities.

Despite the considerable spending on infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia some researchers still see a severe need for more infrastructure investment. “Investments in infrastructure, mainly water supply networks, power plants, telecommunications capacity, housing and transport systems, is highly needed because of a growing population.” (Quilliam and Kamel, 2003 p. 49)

            Other researchers also stressed on the badly needed investment in the water supply sector. Mohorjy and Grigg (1995) noticed that despite the huge amounts Saudi Arabia has spent on water desalination, the country still faces severe water problems and doesn’t have the necessary comprehensive water management system.

            This conflict of researchers’ opinions on the evaluation of the effect of expenditures on the different sectors of the economy and what kind of improvements result from these expenditures in relation to Saudi Arabia is one more reason behind this study.

Research Methodology

To determine if relationships do exist between oil revenue, expenditures, and improvements; and if they do, what kind of relationships they are, the researcher ran simple linear regression analyses of two folds. First, between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure during the period of 1983-2007.  Second, between expenditures on infrastructure and quantitative improvements achieved from these expenditures for the same time period. Also to discover any trend, same analyses were done after splitting the period of the study into three equal intervals of times: 1983-1991,

1992-1999, and 2000-2007.

Data Sources and Data Collection

To conduct this study the researcher used secondary data that he has access to from several sources including existing databases and websites. Data needed for this study consists of three types of data. First, Saudi oil revenue amounts for the period of the study 1983-2007. Second, Saudi main budget expenditure amounts on infrastructure and for the period of the study. Third, quantitative expenditure improvements resulting from the expenditures also for the same period of the study.

Annual oil revenue data for Saudi Arabia for the period 1983-2007 were collected from OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletins for the year 1983 and the year 2007.

Data about the Saudi budget expenditures for the period 1983-2007 were gathered from the Europe World Yearbooks 1983-2007; the Saudi Ministry of Finance website; and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website.

Data on the population of Saudi Arabia for the period 1983-2007 were collected from the website of Population Division of the Department of Economics and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and from Nationmaster.com.

Data on the Saudi infrastructure for the period 1983-2007 were collected from the Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning; International Telecommunication Union Website, and also from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).

            All data collected were then analyzed, sorted, and organized in tables using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.

Limitation of the Study

            Data for this study would have a few limitations that should be indicated. First, data for this study were collected from several sources rather than one source and this may cause inconsistency in the way different numbers have been calculated. Another limitation is the timeline of the study from 1983-2007 may not represent the real relationship between the different variables. Furthermore, there is a chance of bias with those numbers collected from the Saudi government official websites as governments sometimes tend to tweak numbers to fit their own purposes.

Findings

Oil Revenue and Infrastructure Expenditures

Findings of the study revealed that the increase in oil revenue had not resulted in a similar increase in infrastructure expenditures during the period of 1983-2007. Moreover, findings showed that this relationship is not getting any stronger over time. While between 1983 and 1990, each increase of one dollar in oil revenue was associated with a decrease of two cents (-.0216) in infrastructure expenditures, a one dollar increase in oil revenue between 1991 and 1998 was associated with less than one cent decrease (-.0069) in infrastructure expenditures. Moreover, between 1999 and 2007 the increase of one dollar in oil revenue was associated with almost less than one cent (.0047) increase in infrastructure expenditures. At the same time the findings of the study also showed that amount of expenditures allocated to infrastructure regardless of the increase in oil revenue was dropping sharply over time. This amount decreased from an average of $2,583.1 million per year in the period of (1983-1990) to an average of $796.98 million per year in the period of (1991-1998) and to an average of $287.49 million per year in the period of (1999-2007).

           

Conclusion

The findings of the study didn’t reveal any positive relationship between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure in the country of Saudi Arabia during the period of 1983-2007 and the increase in oil revenue had not resulted in similar increases to infrastructure expenditures.

It is very hard to pinpoint the exact reason or reasons why the Saudi government expenditures on infrastructure didn’t increase with the increase in oil revenue. However, one important reason is that the Saudi government has already spent very large sums on building a new and advanced infrastructure in the last few decades since the oil was discovered and money started flowing into the country. This created less need for new large investments on infrastructure and more spending on maintenance and smaller projects. Other reasons may be traced to the general socio-economic and internal situation in the country and may include the following:

a)      Bureaucratic government administration which controls the public expenditures.

b)     Many expenditures occur off- budget such as military expenditures and others.

c)     Large sums of oil money went to pay off government debt and obligations incurred by the Saudi Government from the Gulf War of 1991.

Expenditures and Improvements: Conclusion

As far as the relationships between infrastructure expenditures and the improvements resulted from these expenditures, the study concluded that there are no strong positive relationships between expenditures and improvements measured. The findings also didn’t reveal any relationship between infrastructure expenditures or transport and communications expenditures to improvements measured like road development or number of telephone lines per 1000 people between 1983 and 2007. Improvements in

Saudi infrastructures are considered very modest comparing with other countries around the world.

..

Dr. Ahmad M. Khatib teaches at Argosy University, Chicago.

_________________________________

References

Al-Yousif, Y. (2008). Do government expenditures inhibit or promote economic

growth: Some empirical evidence from Saudi-Arabia. The Indian Journal,

48(2), 92-96.

Clarke, K. (2007). A modernization paradox. Harvard International Review.

Foreign Affairs Magazine (2007), The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Kronemer, A. (1997). Inventing a working class in Saudi Arabia. Monthly Labor Review,

120(5), 29.

International Telecommunication Union (2009). World Telecommunication Indicators

2009 Retrieved March 27, 2009 from

 http://www.itu.int/ITU-/ict/publications/world/world.html

Mohorjy, A. M., & Grigg, N. S. (1995). Water-resources management system for Saudi

Arabia. Journal of Water Resources Planning & Management, 121(2), 205.

Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (1985), Annual statistical bulletin.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (2002), Annual statistical bulletin,

Retrieved May 28, 2009 from: http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20

Statistical%20Bulletin/ASB2008.htm

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (2007), Annual statistical bulletin,

Retrieved May 28, 2009 from: http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20

Statistical%20Bulletin/ASB2008.htm

Pollin, R. (2009). ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: Infrastructure investments and the Obama

recovery plan. New Labor Forum (Murphy Institute), 18(2), 96-99.

Quilliam, N., & Kamel, M. (2003). Modernising legitimacy: Saudi strategies.

Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2(2), 26-65.

Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning (2009). Development indicators. Retrieved

June 5, 2009 from: http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/showcatalog.aspx?lid=26&cgid=1022

Saudi Ministry of Finance (2008). Government budget data. Retrieved June 2, 2009,

From: http://www.mof.gov.sa/en/docs/stats/docs/book4.xls

Smit, H. T. J., & Trigeorgis, L. (2009). Valuing infrastructure investment: AN OPTION

GAMES APPROACH. California Management Review, 51(2), 79-100.

The Europa World Year Book, Country of Saudi Arabia (1975-2007).

World Bank (2009). World Development Indicators. Retrieved June 15 from: http://ddp-

ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&que

ryID-135

Delusions of Grandeur: Tunisian leaders and the loss of civil society institutions

Delusions of Grandeur: Tunisian leaders and the loss of civil society institutions

    Tuesday, January 11, 2011   No comments

By A. E. SOUAIAIA•

On cold winter days, Mohamed al-Bouazizi, a resident of Sidi Bouzid, loads his cart with fruits and vegetables and pushes it along the dusty streets of the town hoping to make enough money for himself and his family. One day, like many other days, town officials harassed him and then confiscated his produce: he did not have the proper licenses to do business.

Many Tunisians his age graduate high school, earn a college education, and then sit in cafés playing cards and waiting for a job. Officially, about 15% of Tunisians are out of work. Unofficially, many economists put that figure at 40%. When the underemployed, the temporary workers, and homemakers are factored in, nearly 60% of Tunisians become affected by the global economic slowdown and the absence of sustainable economic development. Moreover, the uneven distribution of national resources and development programs created two Tunisias. The first Tunisia consists of the coastal cities whose economy thrives on tourism and government services, and the second Tunisia is made out of the interior states that rely on agriculture. The average citizen of the first Tunisia makes nearly $700.00 a month while the average inhabitant of the second Tunisia sustains himself on no more than $100.00 per month.

Al-Bouazizi is from the second Tunisia. He applied for work without success, and when he applied for government grants to start his own business his application was denied. That is very common, too. Government grants and business opportunities are given to individuals associated with the ruling party and those opportunities are generally found in the first Tunisia.

Like many Tunisians, al-Bouazizi wanted a job--any job that would preserve his dignity and that of his family. He figured that selling fruits would help him and that the government should be pleased with his efforts since he is relying on himself, not on it. He was sadly mistaken.

A government like Ben Ali’s does not like people taking initiative or doing anything without its permission. Al-Bouazizi’s entrepreneurship was deemed unauthorized and he was humiliated by the police. He decided to plead his case before the governor, and traveled to see him. When he announced his intention to meet with the governor he was laughed at, humiliated—again, beaten, and thrown out of the building. With the last door closing before him, al-Bouazizi poured gasoline over his body and set himself on fire. People rushed to save him, and he was taken to the hospital. The event triggered angry protests across the state which later spread to most interior states. At least four more youths attempted to burn themselves in protest as well. After two weeks of riots that were met by harsh police measures, President Ben Ali made a TV appearance to threaten rioters and to promise that he will do all it takes to restore order. He sacked several ministers and governors, visited the burn victims, and attacked foreign media (primarily Aljazeera) for inciting disorder.

As I write this piece, protesters continue to demonstrate in every major interior city, journalists and lawyers are arrested, and reportedly 50 people have been killed (officials claim only 14 had died). The government insists that the incident was merely a family, isolated dispute. Protesters, however, are threatening a revolution to overthrow a regime that is corrupt, brutal, and without legitimacy.

Despite the bloodshed, the resilience of protesters, and the brutality of the security forces, Western governments and media hardly reacted. In the U.S., major newspapers, such as the New York Time and the Washington Post, did not run any major story covering these events. It took the State Department nearly two weeks before issuing a statement of concern. The European Union and its major news outlets essentially ignored Tunisian unrest. Now, it seems that all of North Africa may experience violent riots to protest the same issues. This week alone, a number of people were killed and many more wounded and arrested in Algeria. Moroccan authorities seem to have launched a pre-emptive strike and arrested an indeterminate number of young people under the epithet “terrorist.” Is the U.S. ill informed about the state of affairs in Tunisia (and the Maghreb) or are there other reasons explaining this lax attitude?

The short answer is this: the US and the E.U. are well informed about the Maghreb because the regimes there, especially Tunisia’s, are Western-made and Western-approved. The silence is complicity not ignorance. In the end, complicity will only threaten the interests of governments that stand with regimes instead of democracy-yearning peoples, especially when such complicity is made obvious by the selective condemnations of certain regimes and implicit support of others. The public ought to know the facts about Tunisia in order to contextualize the recent and other uprisings.

On November 7, 1987, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali overthrew the first Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba, under the pretext that the latter was no longer fit to govern because of his old age. Bourguiba was a self-declared mujahih akbar (the Great Struggler) whose work helped Tunisia earn its independence. In recognition of his achievements, he was anointed president for life; by whom, we don’t know.

In nearly one quarter of a century, instead of becoming an advanced nation as Ben Ali promised, Tunisia was on a path to social and economic collapse. In the first half of the 1980s, bread riots, labor strikes, and students’ protests brought the country to the brink of collapse. But instead of addressing the real issues, Bourguiba adopted the band-aid approach: he fired and hired one prime minister after another and imprisoned and executed opposition figures while holding sham elections that did very little to build strong civil society institutions. After all, the ruling party has been in charge since the country’s independence.

When Bourguiba appointed Ben Ali as Prime Minister and Interior Minister, he had made his last appointment. On an early Saturday morning in November 1987, the national radio announced the rise of Ben Ali to power. The new president refused to take the “mujahid akbar” label that the national media was willing to offer him. Instead he gave people the illusion that he would be different from his predecessor: he promised openness, democracy, development, and term-limited presidency. Tunisians thought that they would be able to see a new face in Carthage Palace by the end of the second term of any president; that is what the new constitution Ben Ali amended promised then.

Twenty-three years later, Ben Ali is still president. His supporters started a campaign to amend the constitution, for the second time, to allow him to run again. For many, this is a déjà-vu: another irreplaceable “leader” for whom the rules must be bent so that he continues to govern over subjects treated as immature and helpless. For the West, Ben Ali is a known quantity who can be trusted to keep his people in check; after all, his relations with CIA were well documented.

Through constitutional amendments, new election laws, and a strict code governing the press and the media, the regime reneged on all its promises: the term limit was effectively abolished, opposition figures were silenced, business leaders were co-opted, and civil society institutions were uprooted. This time, he did it all systematically and with the West’s tacit approval.

Illusions of Political Pluralism

Although Ben Ali allowed several political parties to contest elections, such parties lacked the social depth and the ideological platform to be able to compete. The real opposition remained banned under numerous pretexts. The performance of political parties in regional and national elections was so pathetic that the regime instituted in election law a kind of “affirmative action” when it reserved a set number of seats in the parliament for opposition parties. This was thought necessary because the authorized political parties failed repeatedly to win any significant votes. By doing so, the regime gave observers the illusion of political pluralism without opening the door to real opposition movements. Ben Ali learned from his predecessor that opening the door to groups such as al-Nahdah Movement could bring about the end of his party’s rule through democratic means. The regime, therefore, opted for political charity with the “affirmative action” election laws instead of open democratic contestation of elections.

Marginalization and Co-opting

In the 1970s and 1980s, the challenge to the single party rule came from labor movements, students, and members of professional associations. Almost every year students in high schools and universities launched paralyzing demonstrations, labor unions went on strikes, and leaders of professional associations provided support for protest movements.

Today, Ben Ali’s ruling party has absorbed many business leaders. Party activists took over student organizations, and universities were relocated to rural areas in order to isolate students from the rest of the populations. Even the large high schools were split into smaller ones to facilitate monitoring and crushing activists.

Regulation of Free Press and Freedom of Expression

The state of the press today is worse than it was during Bourguiba’s reign. Although a large number of news outlets are run by non-government entities, the rules governing the editorial practices are fine-tuned so that any newspaper veering from the official line of interpretation of event would risk being shut down. The only free voice to which Tunisians have access is Aljazeera Satellite channel and website and those are subjected to repeated de-authorization and shutdowns.

Uneven Development

For many visiting foreigners, Tunisia is safe, clean, and affluent especially when compared to other African nations with similar resources. Indeed, the capital Tunis (or part of it at least) and other coastal cities are built for Western tourists: luxurious hotels, clean beaches, and security forces in every intersection. The conditions of the people living in the interior cities, however, are wretched. It must be noted that the uneven development in Tunisia is not new, as it has been known as jihawiyyah since the reign of Bourguiba. However, the elite have excelled at marginalizing regions and peoples in the interior lands. Specifically, Ben Ali’s in-laws (the Traboulsi family) are seen by many Tunisians as a new mafia, not only controlling the means of production and resources, but using the government institutions to establish monopolies and crush competitors. In fact, the French authorities are believed to have pursued charges against one of Ben Ali’s relatives for illegal business activities.

Education and Religious Freedom

Ben Ali’s regime main threat is the youth and religious groups. He marginalized the youth by offering them a placebo. Before 1987, only 12-15% of high school students graduated. The low percentage was not due to students’ laziness, rather, due to government’s measured control of the job market: since most college graduates expected the government to place them in jobs, the government elevated the level of difficulty of the final comprehensive examinations to regulate the job market.

Ben Ali’s regime altered that practice: now, nearly 80% of high school students graduate and move on to college. The result is an increased number of college graduates being unemployed or underemployed, which frustrated the youth of the country.

In order to control the role of religion in the public sphere, the government “nationalized” religious institutions. In other words, individuals are not allowed to form associations, clubs, or attend religious events unless authorized and run by the government. The only orthodoxy is that identified as such by the regime and the only recognized religion is that of the state.

Global Implications

Tunisia is demographically and economically too small to have an impact on world affairs. It is important, however, given its location and memberships.

Geographically, Tunisia is just minutes away from Europe. From the Tunisian coastline, one could cross to Italy using a makeshift raft or inflated tube. In fact, dozens of African immigrants die every year trying to make the journey to Italy, and the European Union has developed strategies to help these “buffer states” keep African immigrants away. One such strategy is paying off North African leaders to act on their behalf. Another more ambitious strategy to combat illegal immigration is the creation of the so-called Union for the Mediterranean, an intergovernmental organization linking 43 countries. The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, promoted this idea not only to deal with immigration but also to offer Turkey an alternative association given his opposition to Turkey’s bid for joining the EU.

Additionally, Tunisia is a member of the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and the Union of Maghrebi States. In other words, Western concern with Tunisian politics is not premised on oil or military matters, but rather on influence. In this way, the West’s alliance with the Tunisian regime differs significantly from Western interest in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, or even Egypt.

Consequently, Tunisia, despite its relatively average demographic and economic weight within the Islamic world, remains central given its location and its memberships. The ten million citizens of Tunisia want to be respected as human beings, to be given the rights of human beings, and to be treated with dignity. When their government does not afford them these rights, and the West supports the regime and offers lip service to the people, their plight becomes another example of Western double standard and Europe’s willingness to sacrifice its commitment to the promotion of human rights to preserve “friendly” regimes.

For example, the West categorizes a number of Arab and Muslim countries as “moderate,” which is a euphemism for pro-Western. These countries include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. It is a known fact that all these countries have a terrible record when it comes to human rights: They hold laughable elections, they incarcerate large number of political prisoners, they torture their citizens, they treat minorities with disdain, and they have no concept of peaceful transfer of power.

The credibility of the West is at stake because of this double standard, which diminishes its standing among the Muslim people when it goes after countries such as Iran, Syria and Sudan for violating human rights, but looks the other way when the rulers of whom it approves continue to abuse the rights of their citizens with impunity. This account is meant to make the public in Western societies aware of reality in places such as Tunisia since the media is effectively practicing self-censorship. It is not an invitation for the US and its allies to interfere in the affairs of sovereign nations, but it is an appeal for their leaders to stop dealing with tyrants, giving despots favored status, and/or shielding dictators from legal actions in international systems. It is a wake up call for the media to live up to its professional role as a neutral institution whose main mission is to inform objectively and without prejudice or favoritism.

• A.E. SOUAIAIA is an associate professor teaching for International Programs, Religious Studies, and College of Law at the University of Iowa.

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A brief reflection on the religious justification behind wearing of faceveils (burqa and niqab) and its assumptions

A brief reflection on the religious justification behind wearing of faceveils (burqa and niqab) and its assumptions

    Tuesday, November 23, 2010   No comments

by Adis Duderija

A number of heated debates throughout the western liberal democracies have emerged recently over the issue of wearing of burqas and niqabs by Muslim women. In this short piece I would like to offer a brief reflection on the religious justification behind the practice of wearing of burqas and niqabs and the interpretational and other assumptions that underlie the arguments of those who consider it religiously binding.
There is no doubt that those who advocate the wearning of face veil as mandatory base this on a number of ‘authentic’ ( sahih) hadith (reports repotedly going back to the Prophet Muhammad SAS) and the qur’anic verse ( 33:53- other verses such as 33;59 are also used as well but primarily to argue for the covering of the body,including the hair but not the face ) that , although addressing visitors to Prophet’s residence how to deal with the wives of the Prophet , is interpreted as to applying to all the Muslim women on the basis of examplary role of ‘mothers of all believers’.
In addition, those who argue for a religiously binding character of the face veil justify it on the basis of having a particular understading of male and female sexuality that is not Qur’anic but is present in some ‘sahih’ or ‘authentic ‘ hadith. They also adopt the religiously normative character of the burqa/niqab on the basis of a juristic maxim of ‘blocking the means’ that can be found in the Islamic legal theory and its principals literature which argues that anything can potentially lead to a ‘ morally undesirable’ outcome that is forbidded is initself also forbidded .
The question that is not often being asked in a plethora of analyses on the issue of face veil is how many women would choose to wear the face veil ( or how many men would ask/ force them to do so) if they did not think that it was religiously required/mandated or even desirable? This is especially so if an alternative and ‘authenic ‘ (and in my view convincing interpretation) that remains even within the classical methodological and epistemological framework , was to be offered along the following lines.
1. The ‘sahih’ hadith mentioned are isolated hadith ( ahad) and according even to the clasical Islamic legal theory scholarship cannot be used as sources of law.
2. The verse uses the word ‘hijab’ not niqab/burqa and is to be seen in the context of a Prophet who was very much a public figure and virtually had little or no private life-including his wives. Many people would come and go to his place of residence at will. His residence did not have anything like doors we have these days. In addition , his house and the rooms of his wives were in essence part of the larger ‘mosque’ complex. Thus, a very busy place. Perhaps an analogy would be apt here. For example, those parents who have children who have reached puberty surely would ask their kids to not open the parents’ room door when they are in the room UNLESS they were permitted to do so by the parents.
So the purport of the verse ought to be considered in this context. This is actually confirmed by the hadith that classical Islamic tradition has customary associated with the revelation of the verse in question. Namely, the context behind the revelation is the bedroom of the newly wedded pair ( i.e. Prophet Muhammad SAS and his wife Zainab)wishing to protect their intimacy and exclude a third person (a person called Anas ibn Malik –one of the Prophjet’s Companions). In short the occasion behind the revelation according to hadith accounts on the matter ( in a number of variant versions) is that on the wedding night the Prophet was not able to rid himself of several tactless guests who remained lost in conversation during and well after the wedding supper while he wanted to be alone with Zainab on their first wedding night. After several attempts to indirectly let the men know that it was time that they left by walking out of his house into his coutyard, according to the witness of the events Anas ibn malik, the Prophet recited the verse in question ( 33 :53 – O you who believe, do not enter the prophet’s homes unless you are given permission to eat, nor shall you force such an invitation in any manner. If you are invited, you may enter. When you finish eating, you shall leave; do not engage him in lengthy conversations. This used to hurt the prophet, and he was too shy to tell you. But GOD does not shy away from the truth. If you have to ask his wives for something, ask them from behind a barrier. This is purer for your hearts and their hearts. You are not to hurt the messenger of GOD. You shall not marry his wives after him, for this would be a gross offense in the sight of GOD.) Upon pronouncing the verse, the prophet drew a sitr (hadith uses this synonym of the qur’anic word hijab meaning curtin) between himself (and his wife zainab ) and Anas.
3. Classical understanding of male and female sexuality that are not found in the Qur’an were such that women’s body PER SE is seen as morally corrupting ( in contrast to being sexual) and that men are incapable of resisting women as sources of irressitable sexual temptation leading to social and moral chaos ( fitna). There is some evidence of this mindset in some hadith. However, this view of male/female sexuality is EMPIRICALLY UNTRUE and any hadith evidence that is empirically untrue , even according to clasical hadith sciences, cannot be valid even if it is deemed ‘sahih’. I think most of us would agree that is also morally ugly to suggest that women’s bodies are morally corrupting per se.

4. The juridical maxim found in Islamic legal methodology literature of ‘blocking the means’ is also problematic since it is not only the women that have to carry the burden, this method, if extended logically, is extremely draconian and one can justify just about anything on this basis ( e.g. as they do in S. Arabia in case of women drivers, talking over the phone to an unrelated member of the opposite sex or even exchanging letters ). Finally, the classical view of male/female sexuality renders human beinsg incapable of ethical and moral progress , in sense of training one’s moral /ethical compass and undergoing some moral discipline by suggesting that any ‘temptation’ wil inevitalbly lead to morally bad actions. Instead, men are portrayed to always succumb to the source of moral sexual evil that women embody. By subscribing to this view one inadvertedly objectifies women sexually- something that the proponents of this view so quickly accuse the western civilisation of doing. Isn’t this just plain morally ugly ?
In a way it remindes me of what I recently heard on BBC radio in relation to the introduction of sexual education in Malaysian schools. Namely those who opposed it (conservative traditional Muslims) use the arguent that the introduction of sexual education in schools will inevitably increase the sexual activity of the concerned. This is a twisted logic and at times serves as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Intra-Muslim Dialogue –is it possible?

Intra-Muslim Dialogue –is it possible?

    Wednesday, November 03, 2010   No comments

By Adis Duderija

Having recently established an ‘e journal’ which solely aims to focus on intra Muslim dialogue ( www.intramuslimdialogue.org) the first comment sent to the website was , may I add unpredictably so, was “Is such a thing possible ?

This question prompted me to reflect more systematically on (and defend) the decision behind setting up the journal on intra Muslim dialogue.

The very question “Is intra Muslim dialogue possible?” it itself is quite telling the current circumstances surrounding those who consider themselves to be Muslim and belong the Islamic tradition however you define these two.

The numerous events of ‘sectarian’ or religiously inspired/justified violence and ongoing repression of many Muslim communities by other Muslims in many parts of Muslim majority world, especially in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia- which have resulted in large number of lost lives- justify scepticism and lack of optimism reflected in the comment I received as an editor of the journal.

However, in my view, this rather grim picture ought not deter us from efforts to trying to improve things for the better. Put differently, the alternative status quo is for many a Muslim today no longer acceptable on both moral and religious/theological grounds.

Dialogue between various religious traditions (inter-religious ) and recognition of irreducible religious pluralism has come a long way recently, at least in theory. I say this as someone who has been active in inter-faith dialogue (predominantly between the Abrahamic religious) at grass roots level as well as someone who has an academic interest in the topic.

But dialogue within religious traditions, especially that of a Muslim kind, has not
kept pace with that of inter-religious dialogue. Why? This is a fascinating question that requires serious academic research and is of course beyond the pale of this short text. Nevertheless, in my view, many socio-political and economic challenges facing Muslim majority countries are at least in part rooted in failures of engaging in intra-religious dialogue. As such, I believe, currently there is a great need to first develop a scholarly discourse around this theme as the preliminary but absolutely necessary step towards fuller, better appreciation and recognition of vast diversity of Muslim experience based on principles of respect and dignity. Hence, the idea of the journal.

I also believe that now there is out there a critical mass of well intentioned and willing people to make greater intra Muslim dialogue based on mutual respect, dignity and celebration of differences and eschewing all forms of violence a reality!

This good will has, of course, exited before as well. To the best of my knowledge, however, most of the discussions on greater Muslim dialogue have been limited to either academic discussions found in institutionalised and commercialised journals very few non-academics have access to or have been ad hoc attempts by individuals.

Hence, this scholarly journal will be of ‘open access’ type and also have a non-peer reviewed section of ‘opinions, analysis and commentary’ open to all not just those who meet the rigorous standards of academic peer reviewing procedures which are so crucial and central to academic endeavour.
One one needs reminding that the global Muslim community is very diverse in terms of race, language, culture, theological denominations and interpretations of religious texts. A call for intra-Muslim dialogue is therefore not a call for imposition of any interpretational hegemony or a push for ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘orthopraxis’. On contrary a call for intra-Muslim dialogue is based upon the absolute need to facilitate dialogue between various contemporary Muslim schools of thought and build bridges of better understanding between them based on the universal values of mutual respect and dignity.
Of course, intra-religious differences and problems, including that of abuse and violence of various kinds, are not limited to the Islamic tradition. Progress that has been made in other religious traditions with respect to intra-religious dialogue and curbing of religiously inspired violence, abuse and rhetoric should give us hope and encouragement that we as Muslims are also capable of the same.

However what will happen in the future will to a large extent depend upon how we approach this very notion of intra-Muslim dialogue.

Where should Muslims build mosques?

Where should Muslims build mosques?

    Sunday, August 29, 2010   No comments

BY AHMED SOUAIAIA - GUEST OPINION | AUGUST 25, 2010 7:20 AM

The Muslim-American community is growing, and with growth comes the need for community centers, mosques, and a public presence. Every state in the United States contains at least one mosque, according to the multicultural marketing agency Allied Media. However, the plan to construct a large community center in Manhattan has started a heated debate about the "wisdom" of building a mosque two blocks from where the World Trade Center once stood.

Some of those who are protesting the plan claim that they are not against American Muslims' rights to worship, they are merely opposed to the erection of a mosque near Ground Zero.

Hence the obvious questions: Why can't Muslims build a mosque there? Where can they build mosques? And why do Muslims really want to build a mosque there?

While some of those opposed argue that building an Islamic center near Ground Zero is disrespectful to the victims of the 9/11 attacks, many are simply opposed to any public presence of Islam in America.

Representatives of American Muslims in Manhattan contend that they need the center because the current prayer hall is too small. They further add that blocking American Muslims from building a place of worship on private land and in accordance with city ordinances would (1) stoke fear domestically and further marginalize American Muslims and (2) give credence internationally to extremists' claim that America is at war with Islam.

Given these positions, the third position (that the center be built elsewhere) obviously makes no sense — Muslims have mosques elsewhere. And where exactly is "elsewhere?" Ten blocks away? Outside Manhattan? Outside New York City?

To suggest that a mosque should be built away from Ground Zero implies that Islam (all forms and expressions of it) is guilty of killing innocent people in the World Trade Center. If we opposed the building of a religious center near areas (or cities) where innocent people were killed, then there would be no place on Earth to build a synagogue, a church, or a mosque — throughout the history of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, self-described Jews, Christians, and Muslims (and in many cases, official representatives of these faiths) have committed, encouraged, and/or catalyzed acts that resulted in the killing of thousands of innocent people.

There is, without a doubt, an undercurrent of hate and total rejection of Islam in the West. There are many (beyond the usual fringe elements) who are opposed to building mosques anywhere. Indeed, there are organized groups around the world whose aim is to ban any public manifestation of Islam in the West. Europe's ban on minarets is one example; the bombing and vandalizing of mosques in numerous American cities is another.

Just recently, a self-proclaimed Christian group in Florida applied for a permit to inaugurate the so-called "International Burn a Koran Day," which would coincide with the remembrance of the 9/11 tragedy. Should the trend persists, 9/11 could turn into "International Bomb a Mosque Day" event.

Sadly, 9/11 is being used as a pretext to demonize Islam and Muslims. And that need to be addressed.

At the same time, Muslims should build their mosque if they need it for the community, not use its proximity to Ground Zero as a context for interfaith dialogue. I am of the view that using tragedies such as 9/11 and the loss of civilian lives anywhere for political or religious propaganda purposes is suspect.

And that applies to both sides.

UI Associate Professor Ahmed Souaiaia teaches courses in the College of Law, International Programs, and religious-studies department.

Gender Justice Jihad in Ramadan by Adis Duderija

Gender Justice Jihad in Ramadan by Adis Duderija

    Monday, August 16, 2010   No comments

On a recent communal breaking of the fast event I witnessed several events that made me think about the real difficulties behind the changing of people’s behaviour in relation to gender justice in Islam.
Before I do the purpose of what I will write below is NOT meant to be an exercise in self-praise although it can come across as such. I am only too aware of my own shortcomings when it comes to gender justice issues in my own household. I am writing this to hopefully raise some awareness and levels of consciousness in Muslim men, including myself, in relation to just one instance of gender injustice.

Let me elaborate. Having arrived at the venue (a local musala ) with some time to spare I greeted and thanked the organiser of the event and asked him if any help was needed with setting up of the tables and the food. With a smile on his face he remarked that there were ‘many women’ around who can / are doing the job. Indeed apart form the man I spoke to (and another one who was setting up the speaker system and opening up toilets) it was indeed all women who were getting things ready while men were happily chatting away .
Few minutes later when it was time to break the fast I realised that ,upon breaking my fast , all the drinks and the dates were on the side of the musala where the men were.

While the men were breaking their fasts women were waiting in the other part of the musala. When I approached one of them that I knew and asked her to come over where the drinks were she was very reluctant like the rest of the other women. I pointed to her and others (including some men who were around) that it was indeed them who not only cooked the food but also prepared setting it all up. I also remarked that it was more just for them to have broken the fast first. Some of the women , younger ones in particular, acknowledged this reasoning, however, none of them were willing to break their fast with drinks and dates whilst men were still at it. However no men seemed to have noticed this despite the fact that the musala is rather small and that several women were also elderly and looked weak.
Don’t get me wrong this congregation that I know reasonably well is by no means conservative and very few of the women (or men for that matter) conform to traditional let also strict puritan norms and standards of behaviour in their ordinary lives.

The same applied later on with the food. While I was trying to protest by telling one of the women ( in the vicinity of other men) that I will not eat the food until at least one or few of the women had taken some first , one of the male leaders of the community who heard what I had said not only remained silent but without being given permission pushed in front of all of the other women who were lined up. The (self-appointed) prayer leader who was symbolically heavily ‘Muslim’ with the turban and all the other paraphiliacs ( whose qur’anic reading, knowledge of Islam, smoking habit as well as personality make him anything but an obvious choice for the function of the prayer leader that he so willingly assumed) was also oblivious to this injustice and insensivity towards women.

Based on anecdotal evidence I am sure that what I briefly described above has happened in many other mosques/musalas.
Why is it that so many Muslim men are so insensitive to gender justice to the extent of branding those few Muslim men and many women who are as agents of “western culture” ? Could this insensitivity in more extreme cases also explain the presence of misogynist thinking among some Muslim men and acts of abuse may that be in the context of marriage or parent- child relationship?
What good does the fasting during the month of Ramadan serve if we are not even sensitive (or choose to be insensitive) to the needs of our sisters in faith? Why do we easily fall for and unquestioningly accept facades and masquerades over essence and what really matters?

My personal goal and wish is to spend the rest of this fasting month improving my own sensitivity to the other gender. I hope you will too.


Adis Duderija has a Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from the University of Western Australia

Interpreting the Qur’an –Towards a Contemporary Approach -Book Review

Interpreting the Qur’an –Towards a Contemporary Approach -Book Review

    Monday, March 15, 2010   No comments

BOOK RE-VIEW/ESSAY

By Adis Duderija, School of Social and Cultural Studies, University of Western Australia

Abdullah Saeed, ‘Interpreting the Qur’an –Towards a Contemporary Approach’, Routledge, 2006, p.192.

The book ‘Interpreting the Qur’an –Towards a Contemporary Approach’ by Abdullah Saeed is concerned with outlining of a systematic and coherent model for evaluating some of the traditional concepts in the realm of interpretation of the ethico-legal aspect of the Qur’anic Revelation and advocating for an alternative, what the author terms ‘Contextualist’, approach to Qur’anic interpretation which would provide a more suitable Qur’anic hermeneutic for meeting the contemporary ‘needs of Muslims’ living in both Islamicate and non-Islamicate societies.

Indeed, professor Saeed’s book is to be seen in the broader context of the multifold and perplexing challenges that the present and (post)- modernity pose to the what professor Moosa terms pre-modern intellectual Muslim discourses including the spheres of law, theology, ethics, culture and politics.

All religious traditions based on the notion of Divine scriptures, as professor El-Fadl astutely points out, inevitably need to come to terms with the conundrum of reconciling seemingly paradoxical claims of historicity of Revelation with its claims to universality.

Qur’anic historicity and its ‘Deutungsbeduerftigkeit’ stemming from the actual nature of its content and its genesis have never been denied by the Muslim tradition. This is well attested by vast bodies of literature written by Muslims over the last 14 or so centuries on the Qur’an may that literature be exegetical, jurisprudential, ideological/sectarian or mystical in its orientation. A number of interpretive strategies and methodological tools have been developed in order to deal with the Qur’an’s need for interpretation /meaning. Professor Saeed ‘s aim is in this regard two –fold. Firstly, he aims to outline the attempts of previous generations of Muslims in this process of interpreting and giving meaning to the Qur’anic content, their epistemological and methodological assumptions, strengths and short-comings as they apply to the Qur’anic ethico-legal content. Secondly, based on the identified limits of the medieval epistemology of Qur’anic hermeneutics characterised by what he refers to as Textualist and/or Semi-textualist approaches to Qur’anic interpretation, Saeed proposes and presents a number of new heuristical methods, broadly termed the ‘Contextualist approach’, necessary for a contemporary approach to Qur’anic interpretation.

In order to overcome the what Kamali terms the absence of time-space factor in the fabric of traditional usul-ul fiqh methodology, Saeed discusses a number of methodological tools, some of which have been applied by previous Muslim scholars from various phases of Islamic intellectual heritage, along with their hermeneutical relevance and utility in the contemporary context. In several instances the author emphasises that his approach highlights the methodological and epistemological continuity with the established tradition wherever such is possible as his method should be seen as being firmly based, inspired by and stemming forth from the tradition itself.
After the introductory chapter, the second chapter provides a context on the contemporary debates relating to the issue of Qur’anic interpretation by revisiting the issues which have shaped these discussions from the very genesis of Islamic thought up to the leading contemporary scholars dealing with the issue of Qur’anic interpretation. Additionally, it brings to the fore several issues, which are considered helpful in understanding the context behind the contemporary interpretational debates on the ethico-moral dimensions of the Qur’an.

The third chapter outlines the traditional Muslim understanding of the concept of Revelation as it pertains to the ethico-legal dimension of the Qur’anic text and outlines several new features of a new theory of Revelation based on the earlier identified ‘Contextualist’ approach. This includes a ‘broader understanding of Revelation’ based on a four level system in which “the socio-historical context of revelation is a fundamental element of revelation…[and] is not divorced from the human instrument including the Prophet, and all of the subsequent Muslim communities to this day” all of whom are entitled to expanding upon its understanding.

The fourth chapter examines the traditional textually based interpretation of the Qur’an (tafsir bi al-ma’thur/ bi al- riwayah), its development and the factors responsible for its entrenchment and subsequent elevation to the level of normativeness at the expense of other approaches (such as tafsir bi al-ra’y or reason –based interpretation).

Reason based interpretation is the theme of the fifth chapter. The revelation –reason dynamic has a long history in Islamic thought whose exact relationship is yet to be systematically formulated. In it the author advocates a view of the important role reason-based approach to Qur’anic interpretation can play in contemporary approaches. Author also points to the traditional rooted ness of the practice and discusses its legitimacy and scope.
Chapter six focuses on the issue of flexibility of reading the Qur’anic texts (based on the traditional understanding of the seven ahruf ) and the possibility that out of this practice a support for the notion of flexibility of interpretation can be deduced.

Chapter seven explores the relevance of the traditional discipline of abrogation (naskh) in the ‘Contextualist’ approach to Qur’anic interpretation and identifies it as one of the most powerful arguments and tools for relating Qur’anic ethico-legal rulings to changing needs and circumstances of the Muslims. Here Saeed echoes the view of Kamali who, in the context of the role and nature of naskh in usul ul-fiqh, asserts that:
[A] borgation which was originally meant to maintain harmony between the law and social reality began to be used contrary to its original purpose. The classical jurists advocated abrogation as a juridical doctrine in its own right rather than seeking it as an aid to the role of the time-space factor in the development of law.

In the eight and the ninth chapters, expanding upon the work of El-Fadl and Barlas , Saeed analyses and critiques the ‘Textualist’ approach to the theory of meaning as it applies to the Qur’anic ethico-legal content and argues for the recognition of the approximation, polysemicity and indeterminacy of meaning as a result of the interpretational tension between the author, text and the reader. In line with Arkoun’s theories , a crucial distinction between Qur’an as discourse (text & context – ‘Contextualist’ understanding of the nature of the Qur’an) and Qur’an as merely a text (‘Textualist’ understanding of the nature of the Qur’an) is made. Saeed argues that Qur’an should be seen both as a text and a discourse if Muslims are to understand it’s true character and develop an adequate hermeneutical model of its interpretation.

The socio-historical embeddedness of Qur’anic revelation is the theme of the tenth chapter although the call for the recognition of this dimension of the Qur’anic content is highlighted throughout the book along with the interpretational implications of such recognition, especially on the ethico-legal aspect of Qur’anic revelation. In this context Saeed astutely points out the limitations of the ‘Textualist’ approach to Qur’anic interpretation which was largely restricted to philological considerations reducing Qur’anic language to “purely legal language [which] has, in my [his] view, been one of the most unfortunate events in the history of Qur’anic exegesis . Additionally he asserts that Qur’anic language is primarily ‘ethico-theological’ in nature and that inherent weaknesses pertaining to the methodological and epistemological considerations relating to the asbab al-nuzul and maslaha sciences as espoused by traditional Muslim scholars are unable to lead to the uncovering of higher purposes and objectives (maqasid) of Shari’ah as embodied by the Qur’an and Sunnah. As such, and in line with Arkoun’s works , Saeed prudently advocates for an anthropological approach to Qur’anic interpretation as a part of the overall emphasis for a more meaningful and hermeneutically more prominent role of the socio-historical approach to Qur’anic interpretation.

The major strength behind the socio-historical approach to Qur’anic hermeneutics is based on the premise that this heuristic would allow for a development of a systematic, coherent and hierarchical model of general and universal Qur’anic values which, hermeneutically, would be its most powerful interpretational tools. This is the subject matter of the eleventh chapter. Here Saeed, as in many previous instances, refers to the works of late Fazrul Rahman and his “double movement theory.” In this regard Saeed presents a particularly useful hierarchy/typology of values and a methodology that would help determine whether Qur’anic values are socio-culturally contingent /specific or universal in nature.

In the epilogue major arguments of the book are revisited. Additionally a systematic, multifaceted and hierarchical hermeneutical model of Qur’anic interpretation is presented incorporating all of methods the author outlined were necessary for a contemporary approach to Qur’anic interpretation dispersed throughout the book.

Arguments put by Saeed are based on a very perceptive analysis of traditional usul ul fiqh and tafsir sciences and several features of Saeed’s hermeneutical model are highly original, systematic and coherent in nature. They present a major contribution to the field of Islamic hermeneutics, especially as they relate to what Na’eem terms the much-needed reform of the ‘historical shari’ah’. Saeed’s conscious attempt to remain within the traditional epistemological framework as much as possible will certainly find more sympathy among usually very suspicious and sensitive Muslim masses when it comes to the issues of their religious heritage, especially the Qur’an.

The reviewer has one major reservation with Saeed’s conceptual approach to this study. It pertains to the larger notion of the nature of the relationship and the interplay between the Qur’an, Sunnah and hadith as widely recognised primary sources of Islamic Weltanschauung.

Given the above mentioned ‘Deutungsbedurftigkeit” of the Qur’an and the symbiotic, organic relationship between Qur’an and Sunnah during the pre-classical era of Islamic thought, as the reviewer has argued elsewhere, a systematic and coherent Qur’anic hermeneutical model ought to include and address the issues of the definition, nature and scope of the concept of Sunnah vis a vis- the Qur’an as well as the that of the Sunnah (and thus indirectly the Qur’an) vis-a- vis ahadith body of texts. This is entirely absent from Saeed’s analysis although the implications of this on the development of a systematic and coherent, what a reviewer would refer to as Qur’ano-Sunnahic hermeneutical model (rather then just Qur’anic), are very significant as I’ll attempt to demonstrate below.

During the pre-classical period, contrary to the classical era in which the “canonised” hadith body of literature was considered the sole vehicle of Sunnah’s depository, its deduction and perpetuation, the concept of Sunnah underwent several semantico-contextual changes and was deduced on the basis of variant epistemologico-methodological tools to that of hadith. A significant body of evidence suggests that during the first four generations of Muslims the concept of Sunnah was independent (conceived primarily but not exclusively in form of ‘amal or practice-based Sunnah) both methodologically and epistemologically from that of hadith , thus was conceptually and qualitatively different from it. In other words the nature and the scope of Sunnah was distinct from that of the nature and scope of hadith. Upon Sunnah’s complete conceptual identification with hadith, Sunnah’s organic link and the symbiotic relationship with the Qur’an were severed. A new Hadith –based Sunnah was seen as something additional to, a necessary exegetical supplement to, and explicator of the Qur’an rather than the other side of the same coin. The traditional post-Shafi’i function of Sunnah was based exactly on this reasoning and was expressed in the well-known maxim in Islamic jurisprudence affirming that the Qur’an’s interpretational need of Sunnah (in form of its sole vehicle, the hadith) is greater then the Sunnah’s interpretational need of the Qur’an. Thus, Qur’an was, as Saeed astutely alludes to on several occasions and especially in chapter four, increasingly hermeneutically dependent upon hadith. Since a qualitative distinction between the nature, scope and character of pre-classical and classical concept of Sunnah as the most widely accepted or solely normative sources of Qur’anic interpretation existed, this affected the epistemologico-methodological parameters within which Qur’anic interpretation was possible to be developed. Since pre-classical concept of Sunnah, apart from its ‘amal component, was primarily conceived in form of abstract ethico-moral and/or theological terms, was reason inclusive and was conceptualised in terms of the broader Qur’anic objectives and purposes (maqasid), it permitted a wider interpretational playfield /framework than that based on hadith-dependent Sunnah.

Thus, the definition, nature and scope of Sunnah and its relationship vis –a- vis ahadith body of texts, will inevitably affect how the question of Qur’anic interpretation is going to be approached. Therefore, it is essential that any systematic and coherent Qur’anic interpretational model incorporate a dimension relating to the role and function of Sunnahic and Hadith elements in it. In order to do so addressing the broader question of the definition, nature and scope of Sunnah vis-à-vis the Qur’an and hadith is of paramount importance.
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