Asia Times Online :: Apathy in the face of cruelty

Asia Times Online :: Apathy in the face of cruelty

    Wednesday, December 14, 2011   No comments

Asia Times Online :: Apathy in the face of cruelty

Since the start of the Libyan uprising, mainstream news outlets have reported that African and even Eastern European mercenaries were fighting with Muammar Gaddafi's forces. The Libyan rebels, eager to minimize any support for Gaddafi among the Libyan population, have fed Western media horror stories of mass murder carried out by black Africans.

Consequently, many immigrant workers were caught between the ire of a regime that did not care much for them and a new wave of prejudice and discrimination fueled by the media and rebel propaganda. The fact that some foreigners fought for the regime


does not tell the full story. Most African immigrants were unwilling participants in a war that no one had anticipated.

In order to understand the presence of so many Africans and non-Africans in Libya, one must understand the role played by the former dictator.

Using Libya's large oil revenues as if they constituted his personal fortune, Gaddafi engaged in meddling in the affairs of his neighbors, supporting nationalist movements, and conspiring to overthrow regimes he did not like.

He also used immigrant workers to blackmail his neighbors. In the 1980s and 1990s Gaddafi gave hundreds of thousands of Tunisian workers hours, not days, to leave the country empty-handed. The sudden "dumping" of workers without their earnings was meant to create economic and social crisis for neighboring governments.

It was his way of punishing the Tunisian authoritarians Bourguiba and Ben Ali. He used the same tactic with the Egyptians. But Gaddafi's most bizarre achievement was coaxing some European leaders to use him as a gatekeeper, in charge of preventing Africans from reaching the shores of Europe.

Speaking at a ceremony in Rome on August 31, 2010 and standing next to (then) Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, Gaddafi declared:...

Reasoned Comments (RC): Jihad Against Islam

Reasoned Comments (RC): Jihad Against Islam

    Saturday, November 12, 2011   No comments

Reasoned Comments (RC): Jihad Against Islam: By Robert Steinback Illustration by James Victore Rarely has the United States seen a more reckless and bare-knuckled campaign to vilify...

Reasoned Comments: The “very scary” Iranian Terror plot: The women of al-Nahda: faces of the new Tunisian r...

Reasoned Comments: The “very scary” Iranian Terror plot: The women of al-Nahda: faces of the new Tunisian r...

    Tuesday, November 08, 2011   No comments

Reasoned Comments: The women of al-Nahda: faces of the new Tunisian r...: by Ahmed E. Souaiaia* Before January 14, 2011, al-Nahda was the main opposition group in Tunisia. No one, even its most severe critics,...

WHY ISRAEL CAN'T BE A 'JEWISH STATE'

WHY ISRAEL CAN'T BE A 'JEWISH STATE'

    Monday, October 03, 2011   No comments

Sari Nusseibeh in Al Jazeera:

The Israeli government's current mantra is that the Palestinians must recognise a "Jewish State". Of course, the Palestinians have clearly and repeatedly recognised the State of Israel as such in the 1993 Oslo Accords (which were based on an Israeli promise to establish a Palestinian state within five years - a promise now shattered) and many times since. Recently, however, Israeli leaders have dramatically and unilaterally moved the goal-posts and are now clamouring that Palestinians must recognise Israel as a "Jewish State".

In 1946, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry concluded that the demand for a "Jewish State" was not part of the obligations of the Balfour Declaration or the British Mandate. Even in the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, when Zionists sought to "establish a home for the Jewish people", there was no reference of a "Jewish State". The Zionist Organisation preferred at first to use the description "Jewish homeland" or "Jewish Commonwealth". Many pioneering Zionist leaders, such as Judah Magnes and Martin Buber also avoided the clear and explicit term "Jewish State" for their project of a homeland for Jews, and preferred instead the concept of a democratic bi-national state.

More here.

What’s Your Theology Like? -On Knowledge, Good Deeds and Spirituality

What’s Your Theology Like? -On Knowledge, Good Deeds and Spirituality

    Friday, March 04, 2011   No comments

Adis Duderija

It would be fair to assert that every religious tradition in human history has highly valued and continues to highly value knowledge, good deeds and spirituality (i.e. in sense of performance of some kind of religious rituals) however differently they were/are defined or put into practice.

What is interesting to explore, and this is the aim of this short article, is the idea of the relative importance placed on these three pillars of religious tradition one vis-a-vis the other. This could be accomplished both comparatively (i.e. across different religions) and well as within the various strands of a particular religious tradition. It could also be examined chronologically tracing any possible patterns or shifts in patterns. An examination of this ‘prioritising’ is useful as it would give us an insight into the ‘ideal’ types of theologies prevalent among the adherents of religious traditions and perhaps be used as a method for developing typologies of theologies.

What I mean by prioritising or the relative importance given to one of the pillars in relation to the other can be best illustrated with the following example. Imagine you had six hours a day to dedicate to expanding your knowledge (not necessarily religious in the narrow term of the word but inclusive of it), doing good deeds or engaging in spiritual rituals? Percentagewise how would you ideally divide this time up? The answer to this question would, in my view, be indicative of the type of theology you subscribe to.

In what follows I‘d like to briefly identify and discuss three different ‘ideal types’ of theologies prevalent in my religious tradition of Islam today through the lens of this triad of knowledge-good deeds- spirituality. Of course, there is a rich history of ideas pertaining to this problematic in Islamic history, especially in relation to the definition of faith/belief (iman). The views on this problematic can be conceived as a kind of a continuum. One side there were advocates who insisted that good deeds (including the normatively prescribed rituals) were an essential prerequisites of iman with the implication that the failure to perform them was tantamount to apostasy- a crime many considered to be punishable by death. On the other hand there were those who subscribed to the view that a tacit or a verbal expression of proclaiming the faith was considered sufficient to be part of the faith community. My intention here is not to revisit these in detail but to describe in broad contours some of the contemporary theologies among Muslims and some of their implications in relation to issues such as nature of revelation and scripture, the relationship between law and ethics and others.

One such theology I call progressive. Progressive theology gives priority to orthopraxis over orthodoxy. This means that it considers performance of good deeds more important than acquisition of knowledge leading to ‘correct ‘ faith/belief or that of engaging in ritual . For this type of theology the human and the human condition are central to it. The discussions pertaining to how to arrive at ‘correct belief’, those centring on nature of God and its relationship with the cosmos and the living creation are of secondary importance. Instead, the alleviation of extreme poverty, being on the side of the wretched, marginalised, stigmatised, and the downtrodden is not only considered the purpose and the primary function of religion it is also viewed as an essential prerequisite leading to orthodoxy. In the Christian tradition this type of theology is referred to as ‘liberation theology.’ This theology, in my understanding of it, holds that humans are considered to experience the Divine most readily and immediately through their interactions with other human beings rather than by contemplating abstractly on the Divine , observing the nature or engaging in various spiritual exercises ( i.e. ritual). This theology , in my view, by implication favours inductive over deductive reasoning/thinking because its foundation and starting point is the world of the human condition with its incredible diversity (including the religious) and complexity which makes it very difficult to think in binary terms (e.g. having salvation –not having salvation). Furthermore, this theology, by giving primacy to good deeds and to the human and by being less concerned about knowledge leading to ‘correct’ belief is also more likely to be egalitarian eschewing any form of hierarchies , most notably those based on gender , sexual orientation, race or ethnicity. In addition, it is more likely to be open to and accommodating of the idea of religious pluralism, i.e. the premise that none of the reified religious traditions made in the crucible of history (as well as those in the present and the future) are capable of objectively and fully capturing the Divine, thus none can claim monopoly over God. This, in turn, translates into the notion that, according to this progressive theology, the idea of God is not fully graspable to the human either through his intellect, mind, reason or the heart. By definition it also implies that that the sacred scriptures cannot offer us humans an unequivocal , clearly accessible and once and for all valid understanding of God through the simple process of reading/interpretation. Instead, it considers the human interpreter and her subjectivities and contingencies as most significantly determinative of the process of interpretation envisaged as a never ending dynamic process that continually evolves with reason. There is, in other words, an organic and dialectical relationship between revelation and reality. Furthermore, this theology gives precedence to reason- based ethics over law. It insists that law must be in constant service of ethics and that law ought to evolve with evolving ideas about ethics as developed by humanity- and in the post-revelatory period this evolution is exclusively driven by reason/intellect. Put succinctly, this theology embraces and even thrives on pluralism, diversity and what’s fundamental to all of it, uncertainty. Based on my own observations I consider this to be a minority theological position among contemporary Muslims, especially among the clerical establishment, but, importantly, a growing one.

The second type of theology can be described as purist. According to this theology, religion is all about correct belief (i.e. knowledge) and everything else is secondary to it. The central concern for the purists is how to, or put more precisely, from whom to obtain the correct knowledge in order to arrive at correct faith/belief. The nature of legitimate knowledge and its sources is, thus, very specifically defined, delineated and guarded. What follows from this is the idea that this purist theology is fixed and focuses centrally on discourses pertaining to God’s essence and nature rather than being focused on the human condition. God is primarily to be found/discovered in the sacred and other canonical scriptures rather then It being experienced through human social intercourses or by contemplating about /on nature and the cosmos. I refer to this as a scripturalist dimension of purist theology or scripturalism. As a corollary, scripturalism is closely linked to what could be termed positivist legalistic theology which views law as not only more superior to ethics but the very embodiment of it. Furthermore, ethics and reason are considered as not subject to evolution and to possess potential for positive change and growth ( i.e. progress). The law, according to this view, does not have a scripturally independent objective, underpinning or rationale. This theology favours, as such, deductive over inductive thinking/reasoning. In its epistemology and methods it resembles natural sciences and eschews uncertainty. Purist theology also favours decontextualized thought and defines good deeds rather statically and literally-independent of their underlying moral trajectories. Furthermore, the ‘rights’ of God are defined often as independent of at times in opposition to and always given precedence over to that of the’ rights’ of humans. The purists’ legalistic theology combined with scripturalism and strong opposition to the possibility of progress defined above also facilitates hierarchical structures, especially those based on religious creed or gender. As a result purist theology shuns religious pluralism, endorses various forms of gender inegaliterianism favouring the prevalent social and cultural customs and conditions of the time of the religious traditions formation and makes forceful theologically exclusivist claims. The scripturalist and decontextualized dimension of purists’ theology also significantly contributes to its strong hermeneutical inclination for narrowing down of legitimate or ‘authentic interpretation’s of the sacred and canonical texts. This theology, in various hues and degrees, in my view has considerable presence among contemporary Muslims.



The last ideal type discussed here is what I refer to as spiritual -ritualistic theology. Here self -introspection and deep meditative-like contemplation takes central stage in contrast to the social human condition (progressive) or that of the scriptures (purists). This contemplative quality takes often form in the engagement in elaborate rituals and recitation of sacred mantras/formulae either in isolation or in a communal setting. This sort of theology often employs the symbolism of the ‘heart’ as the locus of ‘true’ source of knowledge about God in contrast to that of the ‘intellect’ or ‘the sacred text’. As history testifies what is interesting about this type of theology is that it can lead or be accommodative of both progressive-like and purist-like theologies. It can function within the confines of ‘the law’ in form of positivist legal theology mentioned above –therefore be purist –like- or transcend it entirely by adopting an ethically underpinned theology of the progressives.



What does the future hold for these three ideal types of theologies? Are certain types going to be more likely to capture the minds and the hearts of the people? This question, of course, remains open. However with the rise of the moral moral consciousness , the noonsphere, with its simultaneous strong focus on the human condition, deep sharing of emotion, and the embrace of diversity it seems that the progressive theology is best equipped for meeting the ‘religious-spiritual’ needs of those humans who identify themselves to be ‘people of faith’.

Dr. Adis Duderija is currently a research associate at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia in Perth

Building civil society institutions in post-authoritarian regimes

Building civil society institutions in post-authoritarian regimes

    Friday, February 11, 2011   No comments

by Ahmed E, Souaiaia*

Regardless of what happen in the next months, the year 2011 will enter the history books as the breakthrough year for Arab societies. On January 14, 2011, the Tunisian people ended the reign of a ruthless dictator and with it ended fear. The Tunisian revolution soon inspired peoples of other Arab countries to take charge of their own destiny. On January 23, thousands of Egyptians launched a similar revolt to bring an end to Hosni Mubarak’s reign. There are indications that Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan will be transformed with or without protests. The Gulf states, too, will not remain unaffected by revolutions that are not only bringing about political change but also psychological transformation in the soul of Arab citizens; people taking charge of their own destiny and taking full ownership of their state of affairs.

The future of Arab societies is dependent on the transition from authoritarian rule to pluralism. There are many who are calling on the creation of civil society institutions starting with political parties, NGOs, and free press. In fact, just today, it was reported that a group of Saudis formally requested from the kind to allow them to form a political party. It is all positive change, but it may be placing emphasis on the wrong priorities. Establishing these entities immediately may have a long term negative impact on issues of social justice and rule of law. Replacing one-man Arab regimes by multi parties regimes can be just as oppressive and perhaps more suffocating. Instead, it is argued here that the transition to self-governance can be achieved when the separation of power takes precedence over partisan power sharing.

Not to suggest that power sharing among various political parties and representatives of interest groups is not a good thing, for it is. But the power sharing model is also susceptible to creating elite that could--and in most cases did--fence out marginalized minorities and the vulnerable groups and individuals.

What is proposed here is to focus the energy of change ushered in by these popular movements to create safeguards that shore up the rule of law, separate governing authorities, and empower watchdog organizations. The first step for establishing stable self-governing societies in the Arab world is to use the transitional period to draft constitutions, subject to popular referendum, that enshrine the independence of the judiciary, the sovereignty of the legislature, and the service-centered authority of the executive power.

To begin by establishing political parties and NGOs before securing the separation of powers is similar to placing the chariot before the horse. After all, one could ask, how effective can a human rights organization be in a paradigm where the judicial authority answers to the executive officer whose agents are generally the main culprits of committing human rights violations? The authoritarian Arab regimes were able to oppress with impunity because the legislature and the judiciary were tools in their hand. They used these branches of government to provide them with legal and legislative covers even as they arbitrarily arrested citizens, tortured political opponents, and misused public funds.

It will be utterly misguided if the new ruling elite that will emerge after these popular revolutions are allowed to create a new paradigm that would give the illusion of pluralistic governance but in reality preserve a power structure that marginalizes vulnerable social groups.

Civil society institutions are strongest when the legal and judicial mechanisms upon which they are founded are sound. Practically, this can be achieved by recognizing the various layers of civil society institutions.

First, constitutional and legal separation of powers must be guaranteed and established in reality. Moreover, leaders must find creative ways to evaluate and tenure judges. The less politics is involved in identifying, reviewing, and conferring tenure for judges the more empowered the judiciary will be in its application of the law and in preventing abuse of power.

The second important layer of civil society institutions consists of the presence of free and independent press. In most Arab countries, there are many news and media outlets that claim to be free and independent. A close examination of the structure of these institutions and the control over them reveal that they are not necessarily free and independent. Medial and press outlets in Arab countries are either state owned or privately controlled. The privately controlled outlets include newspapers and other media that are owned by political parties, unions, associations, and businesspersons. While the government controlled media are essentially propaganda tools, the privately held outlets promote the narrow interests of the shareholders and owners. Given that the press’ mission is to inform the public, one can hardly believe that an entity thus structured could indeed fulfill its mission with integrity. After all, how could such an institution faithfully serve two masters—the shareholders/owners and the public?

A free and independent press should have as primary mission the dissemination of critical information to citizens. It should exist to inform and to keep the governments’ dealings open and transparent. That goal cannot be achieved if the media or the press answers to shareholders or to political parties’ leaders. Creative and imaginative ways must be used to categorize and license free and independent press—perhaps relying on a combination of public funding, education, training, and legal regulations.

The last layer of civil society institutions would consist of any and all social groups representing all kinds of interests. This layer will be critical in providing services and empowering minorities, but as stated above, it cannot perform its functions if there is no rule of law or if the branches of government are not separate and sovereign.

Islamic societies are at a critical juncture. They could use this opportunity and build forward looking societies. They have a chance to learn from the mistakes of other societies: they can draft better constitutions, they can elect better leaders, and they can establish stronger foundations for the emergence of civil society institutions. They can turn the disadvantage of embracing pluralistic governance late by learning from the mistakes of those who preceded them. They could rely on hindsight to move beyond the shortcomings of older systems. They can reflect on the decades of hopelessness, marginalization, oppression, and denial of basic rights to create inclusive, civil, and proud peoples. They can give meaning to their existence in the clarity of collective wisdom, in the soberness of knowledge, and in the hopeful determination of dreamers.

* Professor Souaiaia, teaches classes in the department of Religious Studies, International Programs, and College of Law at the University of Iowa. Opinions expressed herein are the author’s, speaking as a citizen on matters of public interest; not speaking for the University or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

Diplomatic Hemorrhage: US administration’s need for forward-looking policy

Diplomatic Hemorrhage: US administration’s need for forward-looking policy

    Monday, January 31, 2011   No comments

by A. E. SOUAIAIA

It was a mistake for President Obama to call Husni Mubarak on the fourth day of the Egyptian revolt, after nearly 100 people have died, to advise him for anything else but to step down and let a transitional leadership prepare for fair, transparent, and pluralistic elections. Instead, his reaching out to Mubarak to push him to reform was seen by many Egyptians as an act of support of a dictator. To ask Mubarak for reform now is to give him a second lease on political life. Mubarak has had 28 years to reform. He has not. In fact the last sham elections he held consolidated his party’s rule and produced a parliament less pluralistic than the previous one.

Every day that passes with Mubarak being president, the US administration loses its goodwill capital with the Egyptian and Arab peoples. US administrations have sided with authoritarians for the sake of predictability and short term stability. These authoritarians have fed US policy makers the idea that US interests are necessarily tied to their regimes remaining in power. These regimes have contended that if they were to go, Islamists will turn their countries into another post 1979 Iran. What was left out, however, was the fact that the Iranian people were not and are not inherently anti-American; they were turned to anti-Americanism when the US administrations sided with the Shah and ignored the demands of the Iranian people. This and future US administrations should not repeat the same mistake.

The US support of Mubarak’s regime is well established. Now, the US administration has a chance to show that its commitment to peoples’ rights to freedom and self-determination are not and cannot be compromised. One way of doing this is to take the side of the people now, not when Mubarak falls.

According to Secretary Clinton, who spoke on CNN’s State of the Union today, the people she "want to see stay in power are Mubarak and his newly appointed Vice President." She hinted that she prefers that the current timeline is preserved: wait until this autumn's presidential elections to make change. This position is misguided and clearly rejected by the Egyptian people. The Egyptian people want constitutional reform, judicial reform, economic reform, and political reform; not merely changing the president. This parliament is not legitimate in the eyes of many Egyptians.

The question is no longer whether or not Mubarak and his regime will stays in power. As far as the Egyptian people are concerned, Mubarak is history. Today, opposition leaders, including the Muslim Brethren, which had 88 members in the outgoing parliament have agreed to designate Mohammed ElBaradei spokesperson and authorized him to put together a coalition government that will oversee the transition into democratic rule. The Obama administration could and should support this initiative in order to mitigate previous missteps.

* Professor Souaiaia, teaches classes in the department of Religious Studies, International Programs, and College of Law at the University of Iowa. Opinions expressed herein are the author’s, speaking as a citizen on matters of public interest; not speaking for the University or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

Oil and Infrastructure Expenditures in Saudi Arabia

Oil and Infrastructure Expenditures in Saudi Arabia

    Monday, January 24, 2011   No comments

by Ahmad M. Khatib

The country of Saudi Arabia has been generating increasingly more revenue from sales of crude oil in recent years. The researcher tried to study the impact greater oil revenue has been having on the development of the country’s economy through measuring the impact of oil revenue on infrastructure as one of the most important sectors of the economy. The study explored the relationship between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure during the period of 1983-2007.

The study tried, on one hand, to find out if the increase in oil revenue had been associated with a similar increase in government expenditures on infrastructure. On the other hand, the study tried to measure the improvements these expenditures made by testing the relationship between infrastructure expenditures and some of the improvements resulted from these expenditures during the same period of 1983 to 2007.

The findings of this study suggested that the increase in oil revenue caused only a limited increase in government expenditures on infrastructure and the improvements resulted from these expenditures had also been limited.

Introduction

Saudi Arabia as the largest oil exporter in the world has been collecting massive amounts of cash from oil revenue as prices of crude oil has been rapidly going up in the last few years. Many wonder how this oil revenue is helping the country of Saudi Arabia achieving economic development and prosperity. One way to answer this question is to measure the impact that oil revenue is having on the development of infrastructure. This study tests the correlation or the relationship between oil revenue and infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia during the period of 1983-2007 to see whether greater oil revenue was associated with a similar increase in these expenditures.

The study also looks at the relationship between these expenditures and some improvements achieved from these expenditures during the same time period. The importance of the study stems from the fact that no study had focused on the specific relationship between oil revenue and the Saudi government main budget expenditures in total or individually or on the effects of these expenditures on their related sectors of the Saudi economy. So, the importance of the study comes from the lack of a documented quantitative study on this topic.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Infrastructure is a broad term used by economists to refer to a group of capital assets in a certain country or locality. There is no clear definition of what is included under infrastructure. Nevertheless, Pollin (2009) divided infrastructure into three areas: transportation, energy, and water management. He further divided those areas into sub areas which includes, roads and bridges, airports, railroads, public transportation systems, drinking water, dams, electric grids, and pipelines moving oil and natural gas.

Other researchers like Similarly, Torrance (2009) divided infrastructure into three categories: transport infrastructure, regulated infrastructure such as water, electricity and gas distribution, and social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals.

No matter what the definition of infrastructure is or its components are, the fact is that infrastructure investment stimulates the economy by improving performance and productivity which, in turn, helps bring about economic growth. Smit and Trigeorgis

(2009) believed that infrastructure investment builds a platform and creates a base for the growth strategy and it is the starting point for any investment to follow.

            The largely recognized positive impact infrastructure investments have on the economy as a direct cause for economic growth encourages different governments around the world to allocate sizable portions of their budgets to infrastructure to stimulate the economy, provide jobs, and of course improve their infrastructure.

           

Infrastructure in Saudi Arabia

Ever since oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia, the government has been spending enormous resources on building the country’s infrastructure almost from scratch. The country has achieved significant improvements in building its highways, airports, power generating plants, refineries, desalination plants, shopping centers, schools, and hospitals.

Most of this happened in the last half century as Clarke (2007) commented “Saudi Arabia has gone from a country of fractured tribes living in sand-swept villages, to a thriving, industrial nation dotted with skyscrapers, superhighways, airports and factories.” (Clarke,

2007, p. 32)

            The huge growth in infrastructure was a direct result of the growing petroleum industry. Kronemer (1997) indicated that during this growth that took place in less than 50 years, more than 80,000 miles of paved roads were built, 4000 hospitals and health centers, hundreds of schools and several universities.

Despite the considerable spending on infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia some researchers still see a severe need for more infrastructure investment. “Investments in infrastructure, mainly water supply networks, power plants, telecommunications capacity, housing and transport systems, is highly needed because of a growing population.” (Quilliam and Kamel, 2003 p. 49)

            Other researchers also stressed on the badly needed investment in the water supply sector. Mohorjy and Grigg (1995) noticed that despite the huge amounts Saudi Arabia has spent on water desalination, the country still faces severe water problems and doesn’t have the necessary comprehensive water management system.

            This conflict of researchers’ opinions on the evaluation of the effect of expenditures on the different sectors of the economy and what kind of improvements result from these expenditures in relation to Saudi Arabia is one more reason behind this study.

Research Methodology

To determine if relationships do exist between oil revenue, expenditures, and improvements; and if they do, what kind of relationships they are, the researcher ran simple linear regression analyses of two folds. First, between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure during the period of 1983-2007.  Second, between expenditures on infrastructure and quantitative improvements achieved from these expenditures for the same time period. Also to discover any trend, same analyses were done after splitting the period of the study into three equal intervals of times: 1983-1991,

1992-1999, and 2000-2007.

Data Sources and Data Collection

To conduct this study the researcher used secondary data that he has access to from several sources including existing databases and websites. Data needed for this study consists of three types of data. First, Saudi oil revenue amounts for the period of the study 1983-2007. Second, Saudi main budget expenditure amounts on infrastructure and for the period of the study. Third, quantitative expenditure improvements resulting from the expenditures also for the same period of the study.

Annual oil revenue data for Saudi Arabia for the period 1983-2007 were collected from OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletins for the year 1983 and the year 2007.

Data about the Saudi budget expenditures for the period 1983-2007 were gathered from the Europe World Yearbooks 1983-2007; the Saudi Ministry of Finance website; and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website.

Data on the population of Saudi Arabia for the period 1983-2007 were collected from the website of Population Division of the Department of Economics and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and from Nationmaster.com.

Data on the Saudi infrastructure for the period 1983-2007 were collected from the Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning; International Telecommunication Union Website, and also from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).

            All data collected were then analyzed, sorted, and organized in tables using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.

Limitation of the Study

            Data for this study would have a few limitations that should be indicated. First, data for this study were collected from several sources rather than one source and this may cause inconsistency in the way different numbers have been calculated. Another limitation is the timeline of the study from 1983-2007 may not represent the real relationship between the different variables. Furthermore, there is a chance of bias with those numbers collected from the Saudi government official websites as governments sometimes tend to tweak numbers to fit their own purposes.

Findings

Oil Revenue and Infrastructure Expenditures

Findings of the study revealed that the increase in oil revenue had not resulted in a similar increase in infrastructure expenditures during the period of 1983-2007. Moreover, findings showed that this relationship is not getting any stronger over time. While between 1983 and 1990, each increase of one dollar in oil revenue was associated with a decrease of two cents (-.0216) in infrastructure expenditures, a one dollar increase in oil revenue between 1991 and 1998 was associated with less than one cent decrease (-.0069) in infrastructure expenditures. Moreover, between 1999 and 2007 the increase of one dollar in oil revenue was associated with almost less than one cent (.0047) increase in infrastructure expenditures. At the same time the findings of the study also showed that amount of expenditures allocated to infrastructure regardless of the increase in oil revenue was dropping sharply over time. This amount decreased from an average of $2,583.1 million per year in the period of (1983-1990) to an average of $796.98 million per year in the period of (1991-1998) and to an average of $287.49 million per year in the period of (1999-2007).

           

Conclusion

The findings of the study didn’t reveal any positive relationship between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure in the country of Saudi Arabia during the period of 1983-2007 and the increase in oil revenue had not resulted in similar increases to infrastructure expenditures.

It is very hard to pinpoint the exact reason or reasons why the Saudi government expenditures on infrastructure didn’t increase with the increase in oil revenue. However, one important reason is that the Saudi government has already spent very large sums on building a new and advanced infrastructure in the last few decades since the oil was discovered and money started flowing into the country. This created less need for new large investments on infrastructure and more spending on maintenance and smaller projects. Other reasons may be traced to the general socio-economic and internal situation in the country and may include the following:

a)      Bureaucratic government administration which controls the public expenditures.

b)     Many expenditures occur off- budget such as military expenditures and others.

c)     Large sums of oil money went to pay off government debt and obligations incurred by the Saudi Government from the Gulf War of 1991.

Expenditures and Improvements: Conclusion

As far as the relationships between infrastructure expenditures and the improvements resulted from these expenditures, the study concluded that there are no strong positive relationships between expenditures and improvements measured. The findings also didn’t reveal any relationship between infrastructure expenditures or transport and communications expenditures to improvements measured like road development or number of telephone lines per 1000 people between 1983 and 2007. Improvements in

Saudi infrastructures are considered very modest comparing with other countries around the world.

..

Dr. Ahmad M. Khatib teaches at Argosy University, Chicago.

_________________________________

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ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&que

ryID-135

Delusions of Grandeur: Tunisian leaders and the loss of civil society institutions

Delusions of Grandeur: Tunisian leaders and the loss of civil society institutions

    Tuesday, January 11, 2011   No comments

By A. E. SOUAIAIA•

On cold winter days, Mohamed al-Bouazizi, a resident of Sidi Bouzid, loads his cart with fruits and vegetables and pushes it along the dusty streets of the town hoping to make enough money for himself and his family. One day, like many other days, town officials harassed him and then confiscated his produce: he did not have the proper licenses to do business.

Many Tunisians his age graduate high school, earn a college education, and then sit in cafés playing cards and waiting for a job. Officially, about 15% of Tunisians are out of work. Unofficially, many economists put that figure at 40%. When the underemployed, the temporary workers, and homemakers are factored in, nearly 60% of Tunisians become affected by the global economic slowdown and the absence of sustainable economic development. Moreover, the uneven distribution of national resources and development programs created two Tunisias. The first Tunisia consists of the coastal cities whose economy thrives on tourism and government services, and the second Tunisia is made out of the interior states that rely on agriculture. The average citizen of the first Tunisia makes nearly $700.00 a month while the average inhabitant of the second Tunisia sustains himself on no more than $100.00 per month.

Al-Bouazizi is from the second Tunisia. He applied for work without success, and when he applied for government grants to start his own business his application was denied. That is very common, too. Government grants and business opportunities are given to individuals associated with the ruling party and those opportunities are generally found in the first Tunisia.

Like many Tunisians, al-Bouazizi wanted a job--any job that would preserve his dignity and that of his family. He figured that selling fruits would help him and that the government should be pleased with his efforts since he is relying on himself, not on it. He was sadly mistaken.

A government like Ben Ali’s does not like people taking initiative or doing anything without its permission. Al-Bouazizi’s entrepreneurship was deemed unauthorized and he was humiliated by the police. He decided to plead his case before the governor, and traveled to see him. When he announced his intention to meet with the governor he was laughed at, humiliated—again, beaten, and thrown out of the building. With the last door closing before him, al-Bouazizi poured gasoline over his body and set himself on fire. People rushed to save him, and he was taken to the hospital. The event triggered angry protests across the state which later spread to most interior states. At least four more youths attempted to burn themselves in protest as well. After two weeks of riots that were met by harsh police measures, President Ben Ali made a TV appearance to threaten rioters and to promise that he will do all it takes to restore order. He sacked several ministers and governors, visited the burn victims, and attacked foreign media (primarily Aljazeera) for inciting disorder.

As I write this piece, protesters continue to demonstrate in every major interior city, journalists and lawyers are arrested, and reportedly 50 people have been killed (officials claim only 14 had died). The government insists that the incident was merely a family, isolated dispute. Protesters, however, are threatening a revolution to overthrow a regime that is corrupt, brutal, and without legitimacy.

Despite the bloodshed, the resilience of protesters, and the brutality of the security forces, Western governments and media hardly reacted. In the U.S., major newspapers, such as the New York Time and the Washington Post, did not run any major story covering these events. It took the State Department nearly two weeks before issuing a statement of concern. The European Union and its major news outlets essentially ignored Tunisian unrest. Now, it seems that all of North Africa may experience violent riots to protest the same issues. This week alone, a number of people were killed and many more wounded and arrested in Algeria. Moroccan authorities seem to have launched a pre-emptive strike and arrested an indeterminate number of young people under the epithet “terrorist.” Is the U.S. ill informed about the state of affairs in Tunisia (and the Maghreb) or are there other reasons explaining this lax attitude?

The short answer is this: the US and the E.U. are well informed about the Maghreb because the regimes there, especially Tunisia’s, are Western-made and Western-approved. The silence is complicity not ignorance. In the end, complicity will only threaten the interests of governments that stand with regimes instead of democracy-yearning peoples, especially when such complicity is made obvious by the selective condemnations of certain regimes and implicit support of others. The public ought to know the facts about Tunisia in order to contextualize the recent and other uprisings.

On November 7, 1987, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali overthrew the first Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba, under the pretext that the latter was no longer fit to govern because of his old age. Bourguiba was a self-declared mujahih akbar (the Great Struggler) whose work helped Tunisia earn its independence. In recognition of his achievements, he was anointed president for life; by whom, we don’t know.

In nearly one quarter of a century, instead of becoming an advanced nation as Ben Ali promised, Tunisia was on a path to social and economic collapse. In the first half of the 1980s, bread riots, labor strikes, and students’ protests brought the country to the brink of collapse. But instead of addressing the real issues, Bourguiba adopted the band-aid approach: he fired and hired one prime minister after another and imprisoned and executed opposition figures while holding sham elections that did very little to build strong civil society institutions. After all, the ruling party has been in charge since the country’s independence.

When Bourguiba appointed Ben Ali as Prime Minister and Interior Minister, he had made his last appointment. On an early Saturday morning in November 1987, the national radio announced the rise of Ben Ali to power. The new president refused to take the “mujahid akbar” label that the national media was willing to offer him. Instead he gave people the illusion that he would be different from his predecessor: he promised openness, democracy, development, and term-limited presidency. Tunisians thought that they would be able to see a new face in Carthage Palace by the end of the second term of any president; that is what the new constitution Ben Ali amended promised then.

Twenty-three years later, Ben Ali is still president. His supporters started a campaign to amend the constitution, for the second time, to allow him to run again. For many, this is a déjà-vu: another irreplaceable “leader” for whom the rules must be bent so that he continues to govern over subjects treated as immature and helpless. For the West, Ben Ali is a known quantity who can be trusted to keep his people in check; after all, his relations with CIA were well documented.

Through constitutional amendments, new election laws, and a strict code governing the press and the media, the regime reneged on all its promises: the term limit was effectively abolished, opposition figures were silenced, business leaders were co-opted, and civil society institutions were uprooted. This time, he did it all systematically and with the West’s tacit approval.

Illusions of Political Pluralism

Although Ben Ali allowed several political parties to contest elections, such parties lacked the social depth and the ideological platform to be able to compete. The real opposition remained banned under numerous pretexts. The performance of political parties in regional and national elections was so pathetic that the regime instituted in election law a kind of “affirmative action” when it reserved a set number of seats in the parliament for opposition parties. This was thought necessary because the authorized political parties failed repeatedly to win any significant votes. By doing so, the regime gave observers the illusion of political pluralism without opening the door to real opposition movements. Ben Ali learned from his predecessor that opening the door to groups such as al-Nahdah Movement could bring about the end of his party’s rule through democratic means. The regime, therefore, opted for political charity with the “affirmative action” election laws instead of open democratic contestation of elections.

Marginalization and Co-opting

In the 1970s and 1980s, the challenge to the single party rule came from labor movements, students, and members of professional associations. Almost every year students in high schools and universities launched paralyzing demonstrations, labor unions went on strikes, and leaders of professional associations provided support for protest movements.

Today, Ben Ali’s ruling party has absorbed many business leaders. Party activists took over student organizations, and universities were relocated to rural areas in order to isolate students from the rest of the populations. Even the large high schools were split into smaller ones to facilitate monitoring and crushing activists.

Regulation of Free Press and Freedom of Expression

The state of the press today is worse than it was during Bourguiba’s reign. Although a large number of news outlets are run by non-government entities, the rules governing the editorial practices are fine-tuned so that any newspaper veering from the official line of interpretation of event would risk being shut down. The only free voice to which Tunisians have access is Aljazeera Satellite channel and website and those are subjected to repeated de-authorization and shutdowns.

Uneven Development

For many visiting foreigners, Tunisia is safe, clean, and affluent especially when compared to other African nations with similar resources. Indeed, the capital Tunis (or part of it at least) and other coastal cities are built for Western tourists: luxurious hotels, clean beaches, and security forces in every intersection. The conditions of the people living in the interior cities, however, are wretched. It must be noted that the uneven development in Tunisia is not new, as it has been known as jihawiyyah since the reign of Bourguiba. However, the elite have excelled at marginalizing regions and peoples in the interior lands. Specifically, Ben Ali’s in-laws (the Traboulsi family) are seen by many Tunisians as a new mafia, not only controlling the means of production and resources, but using the government institutions to establish monopolies and crush competitors. In fact, the French authorities are believed to have pursued charges against one of Ben Ali’s relatives for illegal business activities.

Education and Religious Freedom

Ben Ali’s regime main threat is the youth and religious groups. He marginalized the youth by offering them a placebo. Before 1987, only 12-15% of high school students graduated. The low percentage was not due to students’ laziness, rather, due to government’s measured control of the job market: since most college graduates expected the government to place them in jobs, the government elevated the level of difficulty of the final comprehensive examinations to regulate the job market.

Ben Ali’s regime altered that practice: now, nearly 80% of high school students graduate and move on to college. The result is an increased number of college graduates being unemployed or underemployed, which frustrated the youth of the country.

In order to control the role of religion in the public sphere, the government “nationalized” religious institutions. In other words, individuals are not allowed to form associations, clubs, or attend religious events unless authorized and run by the government. The only orthodoxy is that identified as such by the regime and the only recognized religion is that of the state.

Global Implications

Tunisia is demographically and economically too small to have an impact on world affairs. It is important, however, given its location and memberships.

Geographically, Tunisia is just minutes away from Europe. From the Tunisian coastline, one could cross to Italy using a makeshift raft or inflated tube. In fact, dozens of African immigrants die every year trying to make the journey to Italy, and the European Union has developed strategies to help these “buffer states” keep African immigrants away. One such strategy is paying off North African leaders to act on their behalf. Another more ambitious strategy to combat illegal immigration is the creation of the so-called Union for the Mediterranean, an intergovernmental organization linking 43 countries. The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, promoted this idea not only to deal with immigration but also to offer Turkey an alternative association given his opposition to Turkey’s bid for joining the EU.

Additionally, Tunisia is a member of the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and the Union of Maghrebi States. In other words, Western concern with Tunisian politics is not premised on oil or military matters, but rather on influence. In this way, the West’s alliance with the Tunisian regime differs significantly from Western interest in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, or even Egypt.

Consequently, Tunisia, despite its relatively average demographic and economic weight within the Islamic world, remains central given its location and its memberships. The ten million citizens of Tunisia want to be respected as human beings, to be given the rights of human beings, and to be treated with dignity. When their government does not afford them these rights, and the West supports the regime and offers lip service to the people, their plight becomes another example of Western double standard and Europe’s willingness to sacrifice its commitment to the promotion of human rights to preserve “friendly” regimes.

For example, the West categorizes a number of Arab and Muslim countries as “moderate,” which is a euphemism for pro-Western. These countries include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. It is a known fact that all these countries have a terrible record when it comes to human rights: They hold laughable elections, they incarcerate large number of political prisoners, they torture their citizens, they treat minorities with disdain, and they have no concept of peaceful transfer of power.

The credibility of the West is at stake because of this double standard, which diminishes its standing among the Muslim people when it goes after countries such as Iran, Syria and Sudan for violating human rights, but looks the other way when the rulers of whom it approves continue to abuse the rights of their citizens with impunity. This account is meant to make the public in Western societies aware of reality in places such as Tunisia since the media is effectively practicing self-censorship. It is not an invitation for the US and its allies to interfere in the affairs of sovereign nations, but it is an appeal for their leaders to stop dealing with tyrants, giving despots favored status, and/or shielding dictators from legal actions in international systems. It is a wake up call for the media to live up to its professional role as a neutral institution whose main mission is to inform objectively and without prejudice or favoritism.

• A.E. SOUAIAIA is an associate professor teaching for International Programs, Religious Studies, and College of Law at the University of Iowa.

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